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Abstract
In this paper, we give novel certificates for triangular equivalence and rank profiles. These
certificates enable somebody to verify the row or column rank profiles or the whole rank
profile matrix faster than recomputing them, with a negligible overall overhead. We
first provide quadratic time and space non-interactive certificates saving the logarithmic
factors of previously known ones. Then we propose interactive certificates for the same
problems whose Monte Carlo verification complexity requires a small constant number
of matrix-vector multiplications, a linear space, and a linear number of extra field opera-
tions, with a linear number of interactions. As an application we also give an interactive
protocol, certifying the determinant or the signature of dense matrices, faster for the
Prover than the best previously known one. Finally we give linear space and constant
round certificates for the row or column rank profiles.
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1. Introduction
Within the setting of verifiable computing, we propose in this paper interactive certifi-
cates with the taxonomy of [3]. Indeed, we consider a protocol where a Prover performs
a computation and provides additional data structures or exchanges with a Verifier who
will use these to check the validity of the result, faster than by just recomputing it. More
precisely, in an interactive certificate, the Prover submits a Commitment, that is some
result of a computation; the Verifier answers by a Challenge, usually some uniformly sam-
pled random values; the Prover then answers with a Response, that the Verifier can use to
convince himself of the validity of the commitment. Several rounds of challenge/response
might be necessary for the Verifier to be fully convinced.
By Prover (resp. Verifier) time, we thus mean bounds on the number of arithmetic
operations performed by the Prover (resp. Verifier) during the protocol, while by extra
space, we mean bounds on the volume of data being exchanged, not counting the size of
the input and output of the computation.
Such protocols are said to be complete if the probability that a true statement is
rejected by the Verifier can be made arbitrarily small; and sound if the probability that
a false statement is accepted by the Verifier can be made arbitrarily small. In practice it
is sufficient that those probabilities are < 1, as the protocols can always be run several
times. Some certificates will also be perfectly complete, that is a true statement is never
rejected by the Verifier. All these certificates can be simulated non-interactively by the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [10]: publicly and uniformly sampled random values produced by
the Verifier are replaced by cryptographic hashes of the input and of previous messages
in the protocol. Complexities are preserved.
Our protocols follow the proof-of-work protocols of [12, 13] in that they verify that the
Prover has performed some LU matrix factorization. However, they do so by verifying the
factorization and the triangularity of the factors, which remain stored on the Prover side
and are not communicated to the Verifier, rather than verifying the entire circuit that
computes those factors by Lund-Fortnow-Karloff-Nisan polylog-compressive sumcheck
protocols. In [6] we have applied [13] to matrices of exponential dimensions where the
entries are computed from their indices by efficient circuits. Our version of the GKR
proof-of-work protocol has a Verifier complexity that is, within a polylog factor, the
depth of a parallel circuit whose local structure can be compute in polylog time, plus one
linear scan of the input. The Prover complexity is within a polylog factor of the size of
the circuit. The protocols here avoid those polylog factors.
It is possible to reduce the communication complexity in [13] to a constant number of
rounds by when the space complexity is bounded [21] but it is not apparent to us how to
asymptotically preserve the Prover’s time complexity then (it remains polynomial-time).
We will consider an m×n matrix A of rank r over a field F. The row rank profile of A
is the lexicographically minimal sequence of r indices of independent rows of A. Matrix
A has generic row rank profile if its row rank profile is (1, . . . , r). The column rank profile
is defined similarly on the columns of A. Matrix A has generic rank profile if its r first
leading principal minors are nonzero. The rank profile matrix of A, denoted by RA is the
unique m×n {0, 1}-matrix with r nonzero entries, of which every leading sub-matrix has
the same rank as the corresponding sub-matrix of A. It is possible to compute RA with
a deterministic algorithm in O(mnrω−2) or with a Monte-Carlo probabilistic algorithm
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in (rω +m+n+µ(A))1+o(1) field operations [8], where µ(A) is the worst case arithmetic
cost to multiply A by a vector.
We first propose quadratic, space and verification time, non-interactive practical cer-
tificates for the row or column rank profile and for the rank profile matrix that are
rank-sensitive. Previously known certificates have additional logarithmic factors to the
quadratic complexities: replacing matrix multiplications by quadratic verifications in re-
cursive algorithms yields at least one log(n) factor [15], graph-based approaches cumulate
this and other logarithmic factors, at least from a compression by magical graphs and
from a dichotomic search [24].
We then propose two linear space interactive certificates. The first certificate is used
to prove that two non-singular matrices are triangular equivalent (i.e. there is a triangular
change of basis from one to the other). The second certificate is used to prove that a
matrix has a generic rank profile. These two certificates are then applied to certify the
row or column rank profile, the P (permutation) and D (diagonal) factors of a LDUP
factorization, the determinant and the rank profile matrix. These certificates require,
for the Verifier, between 1 and 4 applications of A to a vector and a linear number of
field operations. They are still elimination-based for the Prover, but do not require to
communicate the obtained triangular decomposition.
An interesting setting would be for instance the case when the matrix A is sparse.
Blackbox methods could then be used, when elimination-based method would suffer from
some fill-in. Quite often though, elimination-based methods are then more limited by the
available memory than by the number of computation. A Verifier could then outsource
its computations to a server, for which fill-in would not be an issue, and use only still
sparse matrix-vector multiplications to Verify the result.
For instance, for the Determinant, our new certificates require the computation of a
PLUQ decomposition for the Prover, linear communication and Verifier time, with no
restriction on the field size. The previously best known certificate for the determinant
required instead some characteristic polynomial (CharPoly) computations.
With respect to [7] we propose a complete analysis of the rank profile matrix certifi-
cate 11 only sketched there; an application to computing the signature of a symmetric
integral matrix; and a whole set of new certificates: for triangular equivalence, row and
column rank profile, we are now able to propose protocols that preserve Prover and
Verifier efficiency, while reducing the number of rounds from linear to constant. The
constant round complexity is an important additional bonus in the delegation scenario,
where network latency can make communication rounds more expensive. Note that the
probabilistic analysis of [7, Theorem 4] omitted to account for several possibilities of
failure, which is corrected here yielding a smaller probability of detecting a dishonest
Prover.
We identify the symmetric group with the group of permutation matrices, and write
P ∈ Sn to denote that a matrix P is a permutation matrix. There, P [i] is the row
index of the nonzero element of its i-th column; Dn(F) is the group of invertible diagonal
matrices over the field F; D(2)n (F) represents block diagonal matrices with diagonal or
anti-diagonal blocks of size 1 or 2. For two subsets of row indices I and of column
indices J , AI,J denotes the submatrix extracted from A in these rows and columns.
The set of prime numbers will be denoted by P. Lastly, x u.i.d.←−−−↩ S denotes that x is
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uniformly independently randomly sampled from S. In what follows, while computing
the communication space, we consider that field elements and indices have the same size.
2. Non interactive and quadratic communication certificates
In this section, we propose two certificates, first for the column (resp. row) rank
profile, and, second, for the rank profile matrix. While the certificates have a quadratic
space communication complexity, they have the advantage of being non-interactive.
2.1. Freivalds’ certificate for matrix product
In this paper, we will use Freivalds’ certificate [11] to verify matrix multiplication.
Considering three matrices A,B and C in Fn×n, such that A×B = C, a straightforward
way of verifying the equality would be to perform the multiplication A×B and to compare
its result coefficient by coefficient with C. While this method is deterministic, it has a
time complexity of O(nω), which is the matrix multiplication complexity. As such, it
cannot be a certificate, as there is no complexity difference between the computation
and the verification.
Prover Verifier
A,B ∈ Fn×n
C = AB C−−−−−−→ Choose S ⊂ F
v
u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sn
A(Bv)− Cv ?= 0
Protocol 1: Freivalds’ certificate for matrix product
Freivalds’ certificate proposes a probabilistic method to check this product in a time
complexity of µ(A) + µ(B) + µ(C) using matrix/vector multiplication, as detailed in
Protocol 1.
2.2. Column rank profile certificate
We now propose a certificate for the column rank profile.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
a PLUQ decomposition of A
s.t. UQ is in row echelon form
P,L,U,Q−−−−−−→
UQ row echelonized?
A
?= PLUQ, by Protocol 1
Extract Q[1], . . . , Q[r]
Protocol 2: Column rank profile, non-interactive
Lemma 1. Let A = PLUQ be the PLUQ decomposition of an m× n matrix A of rank
r. If UQ is in row echelon form then (Q[1], . . . , Q[r]) is the column rank profile of A.
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Proof. Write A = P
[
L1
L2
]
[ U1 U2 ]Q, where L1 and U1 are r×r lower and upper triangular
respectively. If UQ is in echelon form, then R =
[
Ir U
−1
1 U2
0(m−r)×n
]
is in reduced echelon form.
Now [
U−11
Im−r
] [
L1
L2 Im−r
]−1
PTA =
[
U−11 UQ
0(m−r)×n
]
= R
is left equivalent to A and is therefore the echelon form of A. Hence the sequence of
column positions of the pivots in R, that is (Q[1], . . . , Q[r]), is the column rank profile
of A.
Lemma 1 provides a criterion to verify a column rank profile from a PLUQ decompo-
sition. Such decompositions can be computed in practice by several variants of Gaussian
elimination, with no arithmetic overhead, as shown in [14] or [8, § 6.4]. Hence, we propose
the certificate in Protocol 2.
Theorem 1. Let A ∈ Fm×n with r = rank(A). Certificate 2, verifying the column rank
profile of A is sound, perfectly complete, with a communication bounded by O(r(m+n)), a
Prover computation cost bounded by O(mnrω−2) and a Verifier computation cost bounded
by O(r(m+ n)) + µ(A).
Proof. If the Prover is honest, then, UQ will be in row echelon form and A = PLUQ,
thus, by Lemma 1, the Verifier will be able to read the column rank profile of A from Q.
If the Prover is dishonest, either A , PLUQ, which will be caught by the Prover with
probability p ≥ 1− 1|S| using Freivalds’ certificate [11] or UQ is not in row echelon from,
which will be caught every time by the Verifier.
The Prover sends P,L, U and Q to the Verifier, hence the communication cost of
O(r(m+n)), as P and Q are permutation matrices and L,U , are respectively m× r and
r×n matrices, with r = rank(A). Using algorithms provided in [14], one can compute the
expected PLUQ decomposition in O(mnrω−2). The Verifier has to check if A = PLUQ,
and if UQ is in row echelon form, which can be done in O(r(m+ n)).
Note that this holds for the row rank profile of A: in that case, the Verifier has to
check if PL is in column echelon form.
2.3. Rank profile matrix certificate
Lemma 2. A decomposition A = PLUQ reveals the rank profile matrix, namely RA =
P
[
Ir
0
]
Q, if and only if P [ L 0 ]PT is lower triangular and QT [ U0 ]Q is upper triangular.
Proof. The only if case is proven in [8, Th. 21]. Now suppose that P [ L 0m×(m−r) ]PT is
lower triangular. Then we must also have that L = P
[
L
0
Im−r
]
PT is lower triangular
and non-singular. Similarly suppose that QT [ U0 ]Q is upper triangular so that U =
QT
[
U
0 In−r
]
Q is non-singular upper triangular. We have A = LP
[
Ir
0
]
QU . Hence
the rank of any (i, j) leading submatrix of A is that of the (i, j) leading submatrix of
P
[
Ir
0
]
Q, thus proving that RA = P
[
Ir
0
]
Q.
We use this characterization to verify the computation of the rank profile matrix in
the following protocol: Once the Verifier receives P,L, U and Q, he has to check that
A = PLUQ, using Freivalds’ certificate [11], and check that L is echelonized by P and
UT by QT . If successful, the Verifier can just compute the rank profile matrix of A from
P and Q, as shown in Protocol 3.
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Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
a PLUQ decomp. of
A revealing RA.
P,L,U,Q−−−−−→ 1. A ?= PLUQ by Protocol 1
2. Is PLPT lower triangular?
3. Is QTUQ upper triangular?
Extract RA = P
[
Ir
0(m−r)×(n−r)
]
Q
Protocol 3: Rank profile matrix, non-interactive
Theorem 2. Certificate 3 verifies the rank profile matrix of A, it is sound and perfectly
complete, with a communication cost bounded by O(r(m+n)), a Prover computation cost
bounded by O(mnrω−2) and a Verifier computation cost bounded by O(r(m+n)) +µ(A).
Proof. If the Prover is honest, then, the provided PLUQ decomposition is indeed a
factorization of A, which means Freivalds’ certificate will pass. It also means this PLUQ
decomposition reveals the rank profile matrix. According to Lemma 2, PLPT will be
lower triangular and QTUQ upper triangular. Hence the verification will succeeds and
RA = P
[
Ir
0(m−r)×(n−r)
]
Q is indeed the rank profile matrix of A. If the Prover is
dishonest, either A , PLUQ, which will be caught with probabilty p ≥ 1 − 1|S| by
Freivalds’ certificate or the PLUQ decomposition does not reveal the rank profile matrix
of A. In that case, Lemma 2 implies that either P [ L 0 ]PT is not lower triangular or
P [ U0 ]Q is not upper triangular which will be detected.
The Prover sends P,L, U and Q to the Verifier, hence the communication cost of
O(r(m+ n)). A rank profile matrix revealing PLUQ decomposition can be computed
in O(mnrω−2) operations [4]. The Verifier has to check if A = PLUQ, which can be
achieved in O(r(m+ n)) + µ(A) field operations.
3. Linear communication certificate toolbox
3.1. Triangular one sided equivalence
Two matrices A,B ∈ Fm×n are right (resp. left) equivalent if there exist an invertible
n×n matrix T such that AT = B (resp. TA = B). If in addition T is a lower triangular
matrix, we say that A and B are lower triangular right (resp. left) equivalent. The upper
triangular right (resp. left ) equivalence is defined similarly. We propose a certification
protocol that two matrices are left or right triangular equivalent. Here, A and B are
input, known by the Verifier and the Prover, and A is supposed to be regular (full rank).
A simple certificate would be the matrix T itself, in which case the Verifier would check
the product AT = B using Freivalds’ certificate. This certificate is non-interactive and
requires a quadratic number of communication. In what follows, we present a certifi-
cate which allows to verify the one sided triangular equivalence without communicating
T , requiring only 2n communications. It is essentially a Freivalds’ certificate with a
constrained interaction pattern in the way the challenge vector and the response vector
are communicated. This pattern imposes a triangular structure in the way the Provers’
responses depend on the Verifier challenges.
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Prover Verifier
A,B ∈ Fm×n
A regular, m≥n
T lower triangular matrix
s.t. AT = B
1: T exists−−−−−−−→
y1 = T1,∗
[ x1
0
...
] 2 : x1←−−− xi u.i.d.←−−−↩ S ⊂ F
3 : y1−−−→
...
...
yn = Tn,∗
[
x1
...
xn
] 2n : xn←−−−−
2n + 1 : yn−−−−−−−→ y =
[
y1 .. yn
]T
Ay
?= Bx
Protocol 4: Lower triang. right equivalence of regular matrices
Theorem 3. Let A,B ∈ Fm×n, m≥n, and assume A is regular. Certificate 4 proves that
there exists a lower triangular matrix T such that AT = B. This certificate is sound,
with probabilty larger than 1 − 1|S| , perfectly complete and occupies 2n communication
space. The Prover complexity is O(mnω−1) field operations and the Verifier computation
cost is µ(A) + µ(B) field operations.
Proof. If the Prover is honest, then AT = B with T triangular and she just computes
y = Tx, so that Ay = ATx = Bx. If the Prover is dishonest, then she must try to
convince the Verifier even if the matrices are inequivalent. For the sake of the argument,
replace the random values x1, . . . , xn by algebraically independent variables X1, . . . , Xn.
Then there are two cases, either AT , B for any T or there exists at least one such
matrix T but none of them are triangular.
In the former case, AT , B, there is thus at least one inconsistent column in B,
say the j-th. Then, there exists a Farkas’ certificate of inconsistency for that column (a
vector z such that zTA = 0 and zTB∗,j , 0). This means that zTAy = 0 for any y, but
zTB[X1, . . . , Xn]T is a not identically zero polynomial (at least the coefficient of Xj is non
zero) of degree 1. Therefore, by the DeMillo-Lipton/Schwartz/Zippel lemma [2, 25, 23],
its evaluation will be zero with probability at most 1/|S|.
In the latter case, AT = B but T is not triangular. Since A is regular, there is thus
a unique n × n matrix T (that is, T = A−1leftB, for any A
−1
left left inverse of A) such that
AT = B: indeed T = A−1leftAT = A
−1
leftB. For the same reason, the equality Ay = Bx =
ATx implies y = Tx. If T is not lower triangular, there is a row-index i such that the
entry ti,jm , 0 for some jm > i. The test y = Tx only succeeds if yi =
∑n
j=0 ti,jxj . Now
the Prover selects yi before xjm is revealed. Therefore, with probability no more than
1/|S| the Verifier selects the field element xjm = 1/ti,jm(yi −
∑
j,jm
ti,jxj), and the test
succeeds for false T .
This certificate requires to transmit x and y, which costs 2n in communication. The
Verifier has to compute Ay and Bx, whose computational cost is µ(A)+µ(B). The Prover
has to compute T , this can be done by a PLUQ elimination on A followed by a triangular
system solve, both in O(mnω−1). Then y = Tx requires only O(n2) operations.
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Note that the case where T is upper triangular works similarly: the Verifier needs to
transmit x in reverse order, starting by xn.
3.2. Generic rank profile-ness
The problem here is to verify whether a non-singular input matrix A ∈ Fm×n has
generic rank profile (to test non-singularity, one can apply beforehand the linear commu-
nication certificate in [3, Fig. 2], see also Protocol 8 thereafter). A matrix A has generic
rank profile if and only if it has an LU decomposition A = LU , with L non-singular
lower triangular and U non-singular upper triangular. The protocol picks random vec-
tors φ, ψ, λ and asks the Prover to provide the vectors zT = λTL, x = Uφ, y = Uψ on
the fly, while receiving the coefficients of the vectors φ, ψ, λ one at a time. These vectors
satisfy the fundamental equations zTx = λTAφ and zT y = λTAψ that will be checked
by the Verifier.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fn×n
non-singular
A = LU A has g.r.p.−−−−−−−→
for i from n downto 1[
x y
]
= U
[
φ ψ
] φi,ψi←−−− (φi, ψi) u.i.d.←−−−↩ S2 ⊂ F2
xi,yi−−−→
zT = λTL λi←− λi
u.i.d.←−−−↩ S ⊂ F
zi−→
zT
[
x y
] ?= (λTA) [φ ψ]
Protocol 5: Generic rank profile with linear communication
Theorem 4. Certificate 5 verifying that a non-singular matrix has generic rank profile
is sound, with probability ≥ (1 − 1|S| )
2n, perfectly complete, communicates 6n field ele-
ments, and can be computed in O(nω) field operations for the Prover and µ(A) + 8n field
operations for the Verifier.
Proof of Theorem 4. The protocol is perfectly complete: if A = LU , then zT
[
x y
]
=
λTLU
[
φ ψ
]
= λTA
[
φ ψ
]
, and the answer of any honest Prover will pass the Verifier
test.
For any i such that the (i − 1) × (i − 1) leading submatrix of A has generic rank
profile, we can write a partial LU decomposition of A with the following notations:
A =
[
L〈i〉 0
B〈i〉 In−i+1
]
︸                ︷︷                ︸
B
[
U 〈i〉 V 〈i〉
0 C〈i〉
]
︸            ︷︷            ︸
C
, (1)
where L〈i〉 ∈ F(i−1)×(i−1) is non-singular lower triangular, U 〈i〉 ∈ F(i−1)×(i−1) is non-
singular upper triangular, B〈i〉 ∈ F(n−i+1)×(i−1), V 〈i〉 ∈ F(i−1)×(n−i+1),
C〈i〉 ∈ F(n−i+1)×(n−i+1).
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Let v[i...n] = [vi, . . . , vn]T ∈ Fn−i+1 for a vector v ∈ Fn, and let
ηi = (λ[i...n])TC〈i〉φ[i...n], ξi = (λ[i...n])TC〈i〉ψ[i...n]. (2)
Consider the following predicate:
Hi : ηi=(z[i...n])Tx[i...n] and ξi=(z[i...n])T y[i...n]. (3)
Note that H1 is what the Verifier checks because then B = In. Note also that when A is
in generic rank profile with A = LU and zT = λTL and x = Uφ and y = Uψ then Hi is
true for all i. To see this consider an LU-factorization C〈i〉 = L̄〈i〉Ū 〈i〉 and the identity
A =
[
L〈i〉 0
B〈i〉 In−i+1
] [
U 〈i〉 V 〈i〉
0 C〈i〉
]
=
[
L〈i〉 0
B〈i〉 L̄〈i〉
] [
U 〈i〉 V 〈i〉
0 Ū 〈i〉
]
= LU. (4)
Then (z[i...n])T = (λ[i...n])T L̄〈i〉 and x[i...n] = Ū 〈i〉φ[i...n] and y[i...n] = Ū 〈i〉ψ[i...n] verify
Hi. Note that the conditions are only tested by the Verifier for i = 1.
At stage i, let Λi,Φi and Ψi be variables for the random choices for λi, φi and ψi and
Zi be a variable for the Prover’s choice of zi. Then Hi in (3) expands as:
xiZi =
(
dΦi +
e︷                   ︸︸                   ︷
n∑
j=i+1
C
〈i〉
1,j−i+1φj
)
Λi + aΦi + f,
yiZi =
(
dΨi +
n∑
j=i+1
C
〈i〉
1,j−i+1ψj︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
g
)
Λi + aΨi + h,
(5)
where d = C〈i〉1,1 and a =
∑n
k=i+1 λkC
〈i〉
k−i+1,1, or equivalently[
−(dΦi + e) xi
−(dΨi + g) yi
] [
Λi
Zi
]
=
[
aΦi + f
aΨi + h
]
. (6)
Suppose now that A is not in generic rank profile, and let i0 be minimal such that the
leading i0× i0 minor of A is equal to 0. On any corresponding partial LU decomposition
this means that d = C〈i0〉1,1 = 0. Furthermore, because A is assumed to be non-singular,
there exist indices k0 with 2 ≤ k0 ≤ n− i0 + 1, and j0 with 2 ≤ j0 ≤ n− i0 + 1 such that
C
〈i0〉
k0,1 , 0 and C
〈i0〉
1,j0 , 0.
We will now prove the two following statements:
1. Hi0 is false with probability ≥ (1− 1/|S|)4;
2. If Hi+1 is false then Hi is false with probability ≥ (1− 1/|S|)2 for 1 ≤ i < i0.
Informally, this means that the Prover cannot achieve Hi0 with any choice of returned
values x1, . . . , zi0 , with high probability and then this failure propagates with high prob-
ability to H1 which is checked by the Verifier. By induction, this leads to a probability
of ≥ (1 − 1/|S|)4+2(i0−1) that the Verifier check will fail when the matrix A is not in
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generic rank profile. Since A is non-singular, i0 ≤ n− 1, and therefore this probability is
≥ (1− 1/|S|)2n.
First, we prove Statement 1, that is the case when d = 0. The Verifier selects a
random λi0 , and then the Prover a zi0 . If the coefficient matrix in (6) is non-singular,
there is a unique solution for Λi0 , which the Verifier will choose with probability ≤ 1/|S|.
Otherwise, the coefficient matrix is singular and the only way for the system to have a
solution is that the determinant
∆ =
∣∣∣∣ −e aΦi0 + f−g aΨi0 + h
∣∣∣∣ = −e(aΨi0 + h) + g(aΦi0 + f)
is equal to 0, which exactly happens in the three following cases:
a.
[
e g
]
=
[
0 0
]
, which happens with probability ≤ 1/|S|2 as C〈i0〉1,j0 , 0;
b. a = 0 (which happens with probability ≤ 1/|S| as C〈i0〉k0,1 , 0) and
∣∣∣∣ −e f−g h
∣∣∣∣ = 0;
c. otherwise, ea , 0 or ga , 0 and ∆ is a nonzero polynomial of degree 1 in Φi0 ,Ψi0 and
evaluates to 0 for the random choices φi0 , ψi0 with probability ≤ 1/|S|.
Overall, Hi0 is false with probability
≥
(
1− 1
|S|2
)(
1− 1
|S|
)3 ≥ (1− 1
|S|
)4 ≥ 1− 4
|S|
based on the random choices of the Verifier: φj0 , ψj0 yield
[
e g
]
,
[
0 0
]
; λk0 yields a , 0;
φi0 , ψi0 yield ∆ , 0; λi0 avoids the unique solution to (6).
For Statement 2, consider the predicate Hi (3) at i < i0, that is d , 0. Similarly, if
the coefficient matrix in (6) is non-singular, there is a unique solution for Λi, which the
Verifier will choose with probability ≤ 1/|S|. Otherwise, the coefficient matrix is singular
and the only way for the system to have a solution is that the following determinant is
equal 0:
0 = ∆ =
∣∣∣∣ −(dΦi + e) aΦi + f−(dΨi + g) aΨi + h
∣∣∣∣ = (df − ae)Ψi − (dh− ag)Φi − eh+ gf.
We block decompose the bottom right block in the incomplete right factor in (1) C〈i〉 =[
d rT
s W
]
, where d = C〈i〉1,1 , 0. We have C〈i+1〉 = W− 1dsr
T . Now since a = (λ[i+1...n])T s, e =
rTφ[i+1...n], we have ae = (λ[i+1...n])T srTφ[i+1...n] and
f − ae
d
= (λ[i+1...n])TC〈i+1〉φ[i+1...n] − (z[i+1...n])Tx[i+1...n]
= ηi+1 − (z[i+1...n])Tx[i+1...n].
Similarly, h− agd = ξi+1−(z
[i+1...n])Tx[i+1...n], and these two quantities are not equal to 0
simultaneously, for otherwise Hi+1 would be true. Therefore ∆ is a nonzero polynomial
of degree 1 in Φ and Ψ. It is equal to 0 with probability ≤ 1/|S|. Overall, Hi is false
with probability ≥ (1 − 1/|S|)2 based on the random choices for λi, φi and ψi made by
the Verifier.
Finally, for the complexity, the Prover needs one Gaussian elimination to compute
LU in time O(nω), then her extra work is just three triangular solve in O(n2). The extra
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communication is six vectors, φ, ψ, λ, x, y, z, and the Verifier’s work is four dot-products
and one multiplication by the initial matrix A (certifying the transposed to have a single
matrix times λ-vector product).
3.3. LDUP decomposition
With Protocol 5, when the matrix A does not have generic rank profile, any attempt to
prove that it has generic rank profile will be detected w.h.p. (soundness). However when
it is the case, the verification will accept many possible vectors x, y, z: any scaling of zi by
αi and xi, yi by 1/αi would be equally accepted for any non zero constants αi. This slack
corresponds to our lack of specification of the diagonals in the used LU decomposition.
Indeed, for any diagonal matrix with non zero elements, LD ×D−1U is also a valid LU
decomposition and yields x, y and z scaled as above. Specifying these diagonals is not
necessary to prove generic rank profileness, so we left it as is for this task.
However, for the determinant or the rank profile matrix certificates of Sections 4.1
and 4.3, we will need to ensure that this scaling is independent from the choice of the
vectors φ, ψ, λ. Hence we propose an updated protocol, where L has to be unit triangular,
and the Prover has to first commit the main diagonal D of U .
For a non-singular upper triangular matrix U with diagonal D = Diag(d1, . . . , dn),
the matrix U1 = D−1U is unit triangular. Thus, for any ψ =
[
ψ1
ψ̃
]
∈ Fn : Uψ =
DU1ψ = D
(
ψ +
[
Ũ1ψ̃
0
])
, where Ũ1 = (U1 − In){1,...,n−1},{2,...,n} upper triangular in
F(n−1)×(n−1). So the idea is that the Prover will commit D beforehand, and that within
a generic rank profile certificate, the Verifier will only communicate φ̃, ψ̃ and λ̃ to obtain
z = λ̃T L̃, x = Ũ1φ̃ and y = Ũ1ψ̃, where L̃ = (L − In){2,...,n},{1,...,n−1} lower triangular
in F(n−1)×(n−1). Then the Verifier will compute by himself the complete vectors. This
ensures that L is unit triangular and that U = DU1 with U1 unit triangular.
Finally, if an invertible matrix does not have generic rank profile, we note that it
is also possible to incorporate the permutations, by committing them in the beginning
and reapplying them to the matrix during the checks. The full certificate is given in
Protocol 6.
Theorem 5. The Protocol 6 requires less than 8n extra communications. The computa-
tional cost for the Prover is O(nω) and the Verifier cost is bounded by µ(A)+12n+o(n).
The protocol is perfectly complete and fails the verification for a non generic rank profile
matrix AP−1 = APT with probability ≥ (1− 1|S| )
2n.
Proof. If the Prover is honest, then A = LUP = LDU1P , so that for any choice of λ and
ψ we have: λTAPTψ = λTLDU1ψ, that is:
zTDy = (λT +
[
zT 0
]
)D
(
ψ +
[
y
0
])
=
[
λ1 λ̃
T
] (
I +
[
0 0
L̃ 0
])
D
([
0 Ũ1
0 0
]
+ I
)[ψ1
ψ̃
]
.
The same is true for λ and φ, so that the protocol is perfectly complete.
Now, the last part of the Protocol 6 is actually a verification that APT has generic
rank profile, in other words that there exists lower and upper triangular matrices L∗
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Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fn×n non-singular
A = LDU1P
P,D−−−−−−−→ P
?
∈ Sn, D
?
∈ Dn(F∗)
Ũ1 = (U1 − In){1,...,n−1},{2,...,n}
L̃ = (L− In){2,...,n},{1,...,n−1}
Choose S ⊂ F
for i from n downto 2:
...[
x y
]
= Ũ1
[
φ̃ ψ̃
] φi,ψi←−−−−−−− (φi, ψi) u.i.d.←−−−↩ S2
xi−1,yi−1−−−−−−−→
z = λ̃T L̃ λi←−−−−−−− λi
u.i.d.
←−−−↩ S
zi−1−−−−−−−→
...
φ1, ψ1, λ1
u.i.d.
←−−−↩ S3[
x y
]
=
[
φ ψ
]
+
[
x y
0 0
]
zT =
(
λT +
[
zT 0
])
zTD
[
x y
] ?= (λTA)PT [φ ψ]
Protocol 6: LDUP decomposition (linear communication)
and U∗ such that APT = L∗U∗. This verification is sound by Theorem 4. Next, the
multiplication by the diagonal D is performed by the Verifier, in order to be actually
convinced that there exists lower and upper triangular matrices L∗ and U∗1 such that
APT = L∗DU∗1 . Finally, the construction of the vectors with the form a +
[
b̃
0
]
is also
done by the Verifier, in order to have in fact a guarantee that L∗ and U∗1 are unit
triangular.
Overall, if the matrix APT does not have generic rank profile, the Verifier will catch
him with the probability of Theorem 4.
Finally, for the complexity bounds, the extra communications are: one permutation
matrix P , a diagonal matrix D and 6 vectors λ̃, φ̃, ψ̃ and z, x and y. That is n
non-negative integers lower than n and 6(n − 1) + n field elements. The arithmetic
computations of the Verifier are one multiplication by a diagonal matrix, 3 vector sums,
4 dot-products and one vector-matrix multiplication by A (for (λTA)), that is n+ 3(n−
1) + 4(2n− 1).
We do not need the following fact to show that Protocol 6 correctly verifies generic
rank profileness, but furthermore, this protocol actually gives some guarantees on the
actual values of D and x, y, z:
Proposition 1. Let S be a finite subset of F in Protocol 6, if APT is not in generic
rank profile, or else if the committed D does not correspond to the unique decomposition
APT = LDU1 or
[
x y
]
, U1
[
φ ψ
]
or zT , λTL, then the verification will fail with
probability ≥ (1− 1|S| )
2n, and therefore Protocol 6 is sound.
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Proof. For a dishonest Prover, either
(i) APT is not in generic rank profile, then Protocol 6 will detect it with the probability
of Theorem 5;
(ii) or she could still try, to send modified vectors x, y, z or diagonal D.
Let then D∗, x∗ = φ+
[
x∗
0
]
= U1φ, y∗ = ψ +
[
y∗
0
]
= U1ψ and z∗ =
[
z∗
0
]
+ λ = LTλ be
the correct expected diagonal and vectors. Let also i0 ≤ n be the largest index such that
there is at least one discrepancy in di0 , xi0 , yi0 or zi0 that makes at least one of them
respectively different from d∗i0 , x
∗
i0 , y
∗
i0 or z
∗
i0 (xn = x
∗
n = 0, yn = y∗n = 0, zn = z∗n = 0
by default). Then Hi of (3) is true for all i such that n ≥ i > i0, and thus in particular
Hi0+1 is true (Hn+1 is true by default). Now, Hi0 is also true if and only if we have both:{
zi0di0xi0 = z∗i0d
∗
i0
x∗i0 ,
zi0di0yi0 = z∗i0d
∗
i0
y∗i0 .
(7)
Indeed, Hi0 is (z[i0...n])TD[i0...n]x[i0...n] = (z∗[i0...n])TD[i0...n]x∗[i0...n] and similarly Hi0+1
is (z[i0+1...n])TD[i0+1...n]x[i0+1...n] = (z∗[i0+1...n])TD[i0+1...n]x∗[i0+1...n]. Further, Equa-
tions (7), with a = z∗i0d
∗
i0
x∗i0 − zi0di0xi0 , and b = z
∗
i0d
∗
i0
y∗i0 − zi0di0yi0 , is equivalent
to: {
λi0φi0(di0 − d∗i0) + λi0(di0xi0 − d
∗
i0
x∗i0) + φi0(di0zi0 − d
∗
i0
z∗i0)− a = 0,
λi0ψi0(di0 − d∗i0) + λi0(di0yi0 − d
∗
i0
y∗i0) + ψi0(di0zi0 − d
∗
i0
z∗i0)− b = 0.
(8)
However, λi0 , φi0 , ψi0 are chosen by the Verifier after di0 , xi0 , yi0 and zi0 have been
committed. Hence, on the one hand, if di0 , d∗i0 then the coefficient of λi0 in one of the two
polynomials is not equal to 0 for a random φi0 with probability ≥ 1−1/|S|2 and then that
polynomial does not vanish for a random λi0 with probability ≥ (1− 1/|S|2)(1− 1/|S|),
based on the random choices made by the Verifier, and Hi0 is violated.
On the other hand, if di0 = d∗i0 , 0, they can be removed from Equations (8) which
then simplifies (for i0 < n) as:{
λi0(xi0 − x∗i0) + φi0(zi0 − z
∗
i0)− (z
∗
i0x
∗
i0 − zi0xi0) = 0,
λi0(yi0 − y
∗
i0) + ψi0(zi0 − z
∗
i0)− (z
∗
i0y
∗
i0 − zi0yi0) = 0.
(9)
When there is at least one discrepancy with the expected vector coefficients, then Equa-
tions (9) can be considered as 2 polynomials that are not simultaneously identically zero.
Thus they both vanish with probability ≤ 1/|S| based on the random choices made by
the Verifier. Hi0 is thus false with probability ≥ (1 − 1/|S|). As in the proof of Theo-
rem 4, this propagates with high probability, to H1 and the dishonest Prover is detected
with probability ≥ (1− 1/|S|)2(n−1)(1− 1/|S|2)(1− 1/|S|) ≥ (1− 1/|S|)2n.
Overall, both (i), APT is not GRP, or (ii), APT is GRP but some diagonal or vector
elements is wrong, are detected with probability ≥ (1− 1/|S|)2n.
4. Linear communication interactive certificates
In this section, we give linear space communication certificates for the determinant,
the column/row rank profile of a matrix, and for the rank profile matrix.
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4.1. Linear communication certificate for the determinant
Existing certificates for the determinant are either optimal for the Prover in the dense
case, using the strategy of [15, Theorem 5] over a PLUQ decomposition, but quadratic in
communication; or linear in communication, using [5, Theorem 14], but using a reduction
to the characteristic polynomial. In the sparse case the determinant and the characteris-
tic polynomial both reduce to the same minimal polynomial computations and therefore
the latter certificate is currently optimal for the Prover. Now in the dense case, while the
determinant and characteristic polynomial both reduce to matrix multiplication, the de-
terminant, via a single PLUQ decomposition is more efficient in practice [20]. Therefore,
we propose here an alternative in the dense case: use only one PLUQ decomposition for
the Prover while keeping linear extra communications and O(n) + µ(A) operations for
the Verifier. The idea is to extract the information of a LDUP decomposition without
communicating it: one uses Protocol 6 for A = LDUP with L and U unitary, but kept
on the Prover side, and then the Verifier only has to compute Det(A) = Det(D)Det(P ),
with n− 1 additional field operations.
Corollary 1. For an n×n matrix, there exists a sound and perfectly complete proto-
col for the determinant over a field using less than 8n extra communications and with
computational cost for the Verifier bounded by µ(A) + 13n+ o(n).
As a comparison, the protocol of [5, Theorem 14] reduces to CharPoly instead of
PLUQ for the Prover, requires 5n extra communications and µ(A)+13n+o(n) operations
for the Verifier as well. Also the new protocol requires 3n random field elements for a
field larger than 2n, where that of [5, Theorem 14] requires 3 random elements but a
field larger than n2. Finally the new protocol requires O(n) rounds when 2 are sufficient
in [5, Theorem 14].
For instance, using the routines shown in Table 1 (one matrix-vector multiplication
with a dense matrix is denoted fgemv), the determinant of an 50k×50k random dense
matrix can be computed in about 24 minutes, where with the certificate of Protocol 6,
the overhead of the Prover is less than 5s and the Verifier time is about 1s.
Computations use the FFLAS-FFPACK library [16] on a single Intel Skylake core
@3.4GHz, while we measured some communications between two workstations over an
Ethernet Cat. 6, @1Gb/s network cable. We see that a linear communication cost can
be masked by a quadratic number of computations, when a quadratic communication
cost could be up to two orders of magnitude worse.
Dimension 2k 10k 50k
PLUQ 0.28s 17.99s 1448.16s
CharPoly 1.96s 100.37s 8047.56s
Linear comm. 0.50s 0.50s 0.50s
Quadratic comm. 1.50s 7.50s 222.68s
fgemv 0.0013s 0.038s 1.03s
Table 1: Communication of 64 bit words versus computation modulo 131071
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4.2. Column or row rank profile certificate
In Protocols 7 and 8, we first recall the two linear time and space certificates for an
upper and a lower bound to the rank that constitute a rank certificate. We present here
the variant sketched in [9, § 2] of the certificates of [3]. An upper bound r on the rank is
certified by the capacity for the Prover to generate any vector sampled from the image
of A by a linear combination of r column of A (‖γ‖0 denotes the Hamming weight of
the vector γ). A lower bound r is certified by the capacity for the Prover to recover
the unique coefficients of a linear combination of r linearly independent columns of A.
LINSYS(r) denotes a complexity bound for solving a linear system of rank r by the
Prover.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
R s.t. rank(A) ≤ R R−−−−−−→
Choose S ⊂ F
w←−−−−−− v u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sn, w = Av
Aγ = w γ−−−−−−→ ‖γ‖0
?= R
Aγ
?= w
Protocol 7: Upper bound on the rank of a matrix
Theorem 6. Let A ∈ Fm×n, and let S be a finite subset of F. The interactive certificate 7
of an upper bound for the rank of A is sound, with probability larger than 1− 1|S| , perfectly
complete, occupies m + n communication space, can be computed in LINSYS(r) and
verified in 2µ(A) + n time.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
J = (c1, .., cρ) indep. cols of A
c1, .., cρ−−−−−−→
Choose S ⊂ F∗
v←−−−−−− α =
{
αcj
u.i.d.←−−−↩ S
0 otherwise
v = Aα
Solve Aβ = v β−−−−−−→ β ?= α
Protocol 8: Lower bound on the rank of a matrix
Theorem 7. Let A ∈ Fm×n, and let S be a finite subset of F. The interactive certificate 8
of a lower bound for the rank of A is sound, , with probability larger than 1− 1|S| , perfectly
complete and occupies m+ 2r communication space, can be computed in LINSYS(r) and
verified in µ(A) + r operations.
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Note that the communication in Protocol 8 involve sending r indices for J , then m
field elements for vector v, and only r field elements for vector β, as it has only r non-zero
coefficients which positions are already indicated by J . Hence the total communication
cost is m+ 2r.
We now consider a column rank profile certificate: the Prover is given a matrix A, and
answers the column rank profile of A, J = (c1, . . . , cr). In order to certify this column
rank profile, we need to certify two properties:
1. the columns given by J are linearly independent;
2. the columns given by J form the lexicographically smallest set of independent
columns of A.
Property 1 is verified by Certificate 8, as it checks whether a set of columns are
indeed linearly independent. Property 2 could be certified by successive applications of
Certificate 7: at step i, checking that the rank of A∗,(0,...,ci−1) is at most i − 1 would
certify that there is no column located between ci−1 and ci in A which increases the rank
of A. Hence, it would prove the minimality of J . However, this method requires O(nr)
communication space.
Instead, one can reduce the communication by seeding all challenges from a single n
dimensional vector, and by compressing the responses with a random projection. The
right triangular equivalence certificate plays here a central role, ensuring the lexicographic
minimality of S. More precisely, the Verifier chooses a vector v ∈ Fn uniformly at random
and sends it to the Prover. Then, for each index ck ∈ S the Prover computes the linear
combination of the first ck − 1 columns of A using the first ck − 1 coefficients of v and
has to prove that it can be generated from the k − 1 columns c1, . . . , ck−1. This means,
find a vector γ(k) solution to the system:
[
A∗,c1 A∗,c2 . . . A∗,ck−1
]
γ(k) = A
 v1...vck−1
0
...
 .
Equivalently, find an upper triangular matrix Γ such that:
[
A∗,c1 A∗,c2 . . . A∗,cr−1
]
Γ = A

v1 v1 ··· ··· v1
...
...
...
...
...
vc1−1
...
...
...
...
0 vc2−1
...
...
...
0 0 ... ... ...
0 0 0 vcr−1
...
0 0 0 0 vn

︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
V
. (10)
Note that V = Diag(v1, . . . , vn)W where W = [1i<cj+1 ]i,j (with cr+1 = n + 1 by
convention) In order to avoid having to transmit the whole r×r upper triangular matrix
Γ, the Verifier only checks a random projection x of it, using the triangular equivalence
Certificate 4. We then propose the certificate in Protocol 9.
Theorem 8. For A ∈ Fm×n and S ⊂ F, certificate 9 is sound, with probability larger
than 1− 1|S| , perfectly complete, with a Prover computational cost bounded by O(mnr
ω−2),
a communication space complexity bounded by m+n+ 4r and a Verifier cost bounded by
2µ(A) + n+ 3r.
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Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
J = (c1, .., cr) CRP of A
Protocol 8 on A
J=CRP (A)−−−−−−−−→
rankA
?
≥ r
Choose S ⊂ F
v←−−− v u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sn
V = Diag(v1, . . . , vn)W (see (10)) W = [1i<cj+1 ] ∈ Fn×r
Γ upper tri. s.t. A∗,{c1,..,cr}Γ = AV
y = Γx x (Cert. 4) y←−−−−−−−→ x u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sr
z = Diag(v1, . . . , vn)(Wx)
zcj = zcj−yj for j = 1..r
Az
?= 0
Protocol 9: Certificate for the column rank profile
Proof. If the Prover is honest, the protocol corresponds first to an application of The-
orem 7 to certify that J is a set of independent columns. This certificate is perfectly
complete. Second the protocol also uses challenges from Certificate 7, which is perfectly
complete, together with Certificate 4, which is perfectly complete as well. The latter
certificate is used on A∗,J , a regular submatrix, as J is a set of independent columns
of A. The final check then corresponds to A(D(Wx)) − A∗,{c1,..cr}y
?= 0 and, overall,
Certificate 9 is perfectly complete.
If the Prover is dishonest, then either the set of columns in J are not linearly in-
dependent, which will be caught by the Verifier with probability at least 1 − 1|S| , from
Theorem 7, or J is not lexicographically minimal, or the rank of A is not r. If the rank
is wrong, it will not be possible for the Prover to find a suitable Γ. This will be caught
by the Verifier verifier with probability 1 − 1|S| , from Theorem 3. Finally, if J is not
lexicographically minimal, there exists at least one column ck < J , ci < ck < ci+1 for
some fixed i such that {c1, . . . , ci}∪{ck} form a set of linearly independant columns of A.
This means that rank(A∗,1,...,ci+1−1) = i+ 1, whereas it was expected to be i. Thus, the
Prover cannot reconstruct a suitable triangular Γ and this will be detected by the Verifier
also with probability 1− 1|S| , as shown in Theorem 3.
The Prover’s time complexity is that of computing a PLUQ decomposition of A. The
transmission of v, x and y yields a communication cost of n + 2r, which adds up to the
m+ 2r communication cost of Protocol 8. Finally, in addition to Protocol 8, the Verifier
computes Wx as a prefix sum with r − 1 additions, multiplies it by D, then subtracts
yi at the r correct positions and finally multiplies by A for a total cost bounded by
2µ(A) + n+ 3r − 1.
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4.3. Rank profile matrix certificate
We propose an interactive certificate for the rank profile matrix based on [8, Algo-
rithm 4]: first computing the row and column support of the rank profile matrix, using
Certificate 9 twice for the row and column rank profiles, then computing the rank profile
matrix of the invertible submatrix of A lying on this grid.
In the following we then only focus on a certificate for the rank profile matrix of
an invertible matrix. It relies on an LUP decomposition that reveals the rank profile
matrix. From Theorem 2, this is the case if and only if PTUP is upper triangular.
Protocol 10 thus gives an interactive certificate that combines Certificate 6 for a LDUP
decomposition with a certificate that PTUP is upper triangular. The latter is achieved
by Certificate 4 showing that PT and PTU are left upper triangular equivalent, but since
U is unknown to the Verifier, the verification is done on a random right projection with
the vector φ used in Certificate 6.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fn×n invertible
A = LDUP , with P = RA
P,D−−−−→ P
?
∈ Sn, D
?
∈ Dn(F)
Protocol 4 : PT and PTU are left up. tri. equiv. with random proj.
U = PTUP U is upper tri.−−−−−−−−−→
Choose S ⊂ F
e1,...,en←−−−−− for i = 1, . . . , n, ei
u.i.d.←−−−↩ S
fT = eTU f1,...,fn−−−−−→
Protocol 6 on A
[ φ̃ ψ̃ ]←−−−−
[ x̃ ỹ ]
−−−→
φ, ψ
u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sn
Now
[
x y
]
is U
[
φ ψ
]
eTPTx
?= fTPTφ
Protocol 10: Rank profile matrix of an invertible matrix
Theorem 9. Protocol 10 is sound, with probability ≥ (1− 1|S| )
2n, and perfectly complete.
The Prover cost is O(nω) field operations, the communication space is bounded by 10n
and the Verifier cost is bounded by µ(A) + 16n+ o(n).
Proof. If the Prover is dishonest and U = PTUP is not upper triangular, then let (i, j)
be the lexicographically minimal coordinates such that i > j and U i,j , 0. Now either[
x y
]
, U
[
φ ψ
]
, and the verification will then fail to detect it with probability less than
(1− 1|S| )
2n, from Proposition 1. Or one can write eTPTx−fTPTφ = (eTU−fT )Pφ = 0.
If
eTPTUP − fT = 0. (11)
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is not satisfied, then a random φ will fail to detect it with probability less than 1|S| , since
e, U and f are set before choosing for φ. At the time of committing fj , the value of ei is
still unknown, hence fj is constant in the symbolic variable Ei. Thus the j-th coordinate
in (11) is a nonzero polynomial in Ej and therefore vanishes with probability 1/|S| when
sampling the values of e uniformly. Hence, overall if PTUP is not upper triangular, the
verification will detect it with probability ≥ (1− 1|S| )
2n.
The Verifier’s cost is that of Protocol 6 with two additional dot products for the last
step, which is µ(A) + 16n+ o(n). Similarly, the communication cost is that of Protocol 6
plus the size of e and f for a total of 10n. The Prover remains unchanged.
Finally, we use [8, Algorithm 4] to certify the rank profile matrix of any matrix,
even a singular one. To do so, we need to verify the row rank profile and the column
rank profile of the input matrix, which can be done with two applications of Certificate 9.
Then, we certify the rank profile matrix of the r×r selection of lexicographically minimal
independent rows and columns we obtained before. This is done by an application of
Certificate 10. We now define Em,{i1,...,in} as the m × n matrix whose j-th column is
the ij-th vector of the m-dimensional canonical basis. This certificate is detailed in
Protocol 11, in the case where m ≤ n. If n < m, one should first apply Protocol 9 on
A to compute its column rank profile, and then apply the verification steps of the same
protocol for the row rank profile of A. The application of Protocol 10 remains unchanged.
Theorem 10. Protocol 11 is sound, with probability ≥ (1− 1|S| )
2n, and perfectly complete.
The Prover cost is O(mnrω−2) field operations, the communication space is bounded by
m+ n+ min(m,n) + 17r and the Verifier cost is bounded by 4µ(A) +m+ n+ 21r.
Proof. If the Prover is honest, I is the row rank profile of A and J is the column rank
profile of A. Then, the application of Protocol 10 will output the correct rank profile
matrix of AI,J which will lead the Verifier to the correct rank profile matrix of A, as
described in [8, Theorem 37]. Note that one only needs to verify the lower bound on the
rank of A once, which is why Certificate 9 is fully executed once, while the second run
only verifies that the committed rank profile is a rank profile indeed.
Now, for the soundness, Prover has a probability ≥ 1 − 1/|S| to be caught when
cheating while running Certificate 9, and a probability ≥ (1− 1|S| )
2n to be caught when
cheating while running Certificate 10. Overall, this makes a probability ≥ (1− 1|S| )
2n for
the Verifier to catch a cheating Prover during the execution of Certificate 11.
For the complexity, Prover time complexity is bounded by the complexity of perform-
ing a PLUQ decomposition of the input matrix, O(mnrω−2). The Verifier complexity is
the one of one full application of Protocol 9 and one application of Protocol 9 without
applying Protocol 8, which makes 3µ(A)+n+m+5r, plus one application of Protocol 10
over an r×r matrix for a cost of µ(A)+16r+o(r), the computation of RA only consists of
memory operations, hence a total cost of 4µ(A)+m+n+21r+o(r) field operations. Com-
munication space is computed as follows: a full application of Protocol 9 on A if m ≥ n,
on AT otherwise, an application of the same Protocol without the underlying Protocol 8
which makes n+m+min(m,n) + 7r and the same application of Protocol 10 as above,
for a cost of 10r, hence a total communication space of m+ n+min(m,n) + 17r.
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Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n (assuming m ≤ n w.l.o.g.)
Protocol 9 on AT
I=RRP (A)∈[[1,m]]r−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Now, I = RRP (A)
and rank(A) ≥ r
J = CRP (A) = (c1, . . . , cr)
J−−−−−−→
Choose S ⊂ F
v←−−−−− v u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sn
V = Diag(v1, . . . , vn)W (see (10)) W = [1i<cj+1 ] ∈ Fn×r
Γ upper tri. s.t. A∗,{c1,..,cr}Γ = AV
y = Γx x (Cert. 4) y←−−−−−−−→ x u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sr
z = Diag(v1, . . . , vn)(Wx)
zcj = zcj−yj for j = 1..r
Az
?= 0
Protocol 10 on AI,J
Rr=RPM(AI,J )−−−−−−−−−−−→
RA = Em,IRrETn,J
Protocol 11: Rank profile matrix
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5. Certificate for the signature of an integer matrix
The signature of a symmetric matrix is the triple (n+, n−, n0) indicating the number
of positive, negative, and zero eigenvalues, respectively. Just like [3, Theorem 5], the idea
is that the Prover commits the signature, and then certifies it modulo a Verifier chosen
prime. This works directly for the signature algorithm in [15, Corollary 1] together with
the CharPoly protocol of [5, Theorem 14]. As in § 4.1, in the dense case we propose
here to replace the CharPoly computation with a symmetric Gaussian elimination.
Over the rationals, an algorithm for the Prover could be to first compute and certify
the rank of A, and to compute a permutation matrix P such that PTAP has generic
rank profile: for instance compute a PLp∆pLTp PT factorization modulo a sufficiently
large prime p. Then B = [Ir|0]PTAP
[
Ir
0
]
is symmetric and non-singular. It is then
sufficient to lift or reconstruct only the block diagonal matrix ∆ over Q of a non-pivoting
symmetric factorization of B (the unit triangular matrix over Q need not be computed).
Compared to an integer characteristic polynomial computation this gains in practice an
order of magnitude in efficiency for the Prover as shown on the logscale Figure 1, using
LinBox-1.5.1 [17].
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Rational lifting of the diagonal
Figure 1: (Verifiable) signature computation on a single Intel Skylake core @3.4GHz.
For the verification, the block diagonal matrix ∆, and the permutation P are commit-
ted. The Verifier then randomly chooses a prime q and enters an interactive certification
process for P and ∆ mod q using Protocol 6, as shown on Protocol 12.
From [3, Theorem 5], we let h = log2(
√
nn||A||n∞) be the logarithm of Hadamard’s
bound for the invariant factors of A. There cannot be more than h primes reducing
the rank. Therefore it is possible to sample c · h distinct primes of magnitude bounded
by O(h log(h)) for any constant c > 2 and select q1 from that set S1. Once the rank
is certified, the Prover can compute the permutation and lift the diagonal. Finally the
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Prover Verifier
A ∈ Zn×n symmetric
I−−−−−−−→
q1←−−−−−−− q1
u.i.d.
←−−−↩ S1 ⊂ P
. . . I ?= RRP (A) = CRP (A) mod q1,
and |I| ?= rank(A) mod q1 by Cert. 9.
P,∆−−−−−−−→ P
?
∈ Sr, ∆
?
∈ D(2)r (Q)
q2←−−−−−−− q2
u.i.d.
←−−−↩ S2 ⊂ P
Protocol 6 on PTAIP mod q2
[ φ̃i ψ̃i ]←−−−−−
[ x̃i ỹi ]−−−−−→
[ λ̃i ]←−−−
[ z̃i ]−−−→
...
zT∆
[
x y
] ?= (λTPTAI)P [φ ψ] mod q2
Extract (n+(∆), n−(∆), n− r)
Protocol 12: Certificate for the signature of a symmetric matrix
rational PL∆LTPT factorization of the full rank matrix can be similarly verified modulo
a prime q2. As for the determinant, no more than h primes can reduce the rank of ∆
and q2 can be selected from the same kind of set. We have proven:
Corollary 2. For a symmetric matrix A ∈ Zn×n, certificate 12 for its signature is sound
and perfectly complete.
The communication comprise that of the Certificate 6, the permutation matrix P ,
all of size n, as well as small primes bounded by h, and finally ∆. Just like that of the
characteristic polynomial, the size of ∆ can be quadratic and therefore the whole protocol
is not linear. Thus a simpler quadratic certificate communicating the triangular matrix
L modulo q2, and checking the decomposition A−L∆LT via Freivalds’ certificate might
also work. But then the communication and Verifier time would always be quadratic.
Instead, Protocol 12, just like the Protocol using the characteristic polynomial, is better
if the size of the determinant is small, as then the size of ∆ might be much less than that
of L (for instance linear if the determinant is a constant). Protocol 12 is also interesting
if µ(A) is less than quadratic.
6. Constant round certificates
When delegating computations, the network latency can make communication rounds
expensive. It can therefore also be interesting not only to reduce the communication
volume, but also the number of rounds. We therefore propose in this section a certificate
with a constant number of rounds for triangular equivalence, still preserving Prover
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efficiency as well as linear communication volume and Verifier cost. This applies then
directly, as previously shown, to row or column rank profiles. However it fails to apply
to the generic rank profile, at least in a straightforward manner, and we were unable to
produce such a certificate in constant round for this task.
6.1. Representative Laurent polynomial of a matrix
Following a technique in [18], we first define the representative Laurent polynomial,
PA(X) of an m×n matrix A as :
PA(X) =
[
1 X X2 . . . Xm−1
]
·A ·

1
X−1
...
X1−n
 =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Ai,jX
i−j
Therefore, if a matrix is lower triangular, then its representative Laurent polynomial
cannot have negative powers and it is therefore a polynomial of degree at most m − 1.
The converse is not true, consider for instance an upper diagonal with two opposite
coefficients : Ai,i+1 = 0 for all i except A1,2 = −A2,3. Generically, if one pre-multiplies
A on the right by a random non-zero diagonal matrix, these cancellations will not occur
as in general d1A1,2,− d2A2,3 unless A1,2 = A2,3 = 0.
6.2. Constant round triangular equivalence certificate
From this representation we can obtain a triangular equivalence certificate that re-
quires only a constant number of rounds: the Prover commits that polynomial, then the
Verifier will evaluate the polynomial at a random point and compare this to the actual
projections. The counterpart is that the field size must be sufficiently large so that the
polynomial identity testing does not fail. The full certificate is given in Protocol 13.
It requires that the Prover solves a regular system (this is checked deterministically by
reapplying the resulting vector), and a preconditioning by a diagonal matrix to prevent
cancellations.
Theorem 11. Let A,B ∈ Fm×n, m≥n, and assume A is regular. Certificate 13 is
sound, with probability larger than 1 − 2n−1|S| and perfectly complete. The Prover cost
is dominated by one system solving, O(mnω−1), the communication space is bounded by
3n+ 1 and the Verifier cost is bounded by µ(A) + µ(B) + 7n
Proof. Let x = D

1
λ−1
...
λ1−n
. As A is regular, there is only one solution y to Ay = Bx, and
y = Lx. Therefore
[
1 λ . . . λn−1
]
· y =
[
1 λ . . . λn−1
]
·LD

1
λ−1
...
λ1−n
 = PLD(λ) and the
protocol is correct. For the soundness:
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Prover Verifier
A,B ∈ Fm×n
A is regular, m≥n
∃L lower triang. s.t. AL = B ∃L−−−−−−→
Choose S ⊂ F
D←−−−−−− D u.i.d.←−−−↩ Dn(S\{0})
g(X) = PLD(X)
g(X)−−−−−−→ g
?
∈ F[X]deg≤n−1
λ←−−−−−− λ u.i.d.←−−−↩ S
y, s.t. A · y = B ·D ·

1
λ−1
...
λ1−n
 y−−−−−−→ A · y ?= B ·D ·

1
λ−1
...
λ1−n

g(λ) ?=
[
1 λ . . . λn−1
]
· y
Protocol 13: Constant round linear communication certificate for triangular equivalence
• As A is regular, there is only one solution y to Ay = Bx, thus that check ensures
that y is correct, unless not all columns in B are in the column space of A, which
is handled as in the proof of Theorem 3.
• If L is not triangular then its upper part is not identically zero. Therefore by
considering D as a diagonal matrix of indeterminates, at least one coefficient of
negative degree of the representative rational fraction LD will be non identically
zero. As those are of degree 1 in the indeterminates of D, for a random diagonal D,
the representative rational fraction of LD will not be a polynomial with probability
at least 1− 1|S|−1 .
• If g is not a polynomial of degree at most n − 1, it is not the representative of a
triangular matrix.
• If g is not the representative polynomial of LD then by the DeMillo-Lipton/
Schwartz/Zippel lemma [2, 25, 23], its evaluation at λ will fail with probability
1− 2n−1|S| (since X
n−1(g − PLD)(X) is a polynomial of degree at most 2(n− 1)).
For the complexity, the Prover computes L, in O(mnω−1). Then PLD(X) requires one
pass over the coefficients of L, and finally y = LD

1
λ−1
...
λ1−n
. The communication cost is
D, g(X), y all of size n, and λ. The Verifier cost is, µ(A) + µ(B) to apply A and B, as
well as 2n − 3 to compute
[
1 λ . . . λn−1
]
and their inverses, n − 2 to multiply by D,
2(n− 1) to evaluate g, and 2(n− 1) to compute the dotproduct
[
1 λ . . . λn−1
]
· y.
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6.3. Constant round certificates for the row and column rank profiles
Now we can combine the lower rank Certificate 8, with the constant-round Certifi-
cate 13 for triangular equivalence, as a replacement of Certificate 4, within the column
rank profile Certificate 9, in order to get the constant-round Certificate 14 for column
rank profile. It remains Prover efficient, linear in communication volume and Verifier
time.
Prover Verifier
A ∈ Fm×n
J = (c1, .., cr) CRP of A
J−−−−−−→ Choose S ⊂ F
β s.t. Aβ = ν
Protocol 8
ν←−−−−−−
β−−−−−−→
α = Em,J (
u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sr)
ν = Aα
β
?= α
V = Diag(v1, . . . , vn)W (see (10))
v←−−−−−− v u.i.d.←−−−↩ Sn
Γ upper tri. s.t. A∗,JΓ = AV W = [1i<cj+1 ] ∈ Fn×r
Protocol 13
on A∗,J and B = AV
D←−−−−−−
g(X)−−−−−−→
λ←−−−−−−
y−−−−−−→
z = Diag(vi)WD

1
λ−1
...
λ1−r

zcj = zcj−yj , j = 1..r
Az
?= 0
g(λ) ?=
[
1 λ . . . λr−1
]
y
Protocol 14: Constant-round certificate for the column rank profile
Corollary 3. For an m×n matrix of rank r, Certificate 14 is sound and perfectly com-
plete. It requires 3 rounds, a volume of communication of m+ n+ 5r + 1 and less than
2µ(A) + n+ 9r operations for the Verifier.
7. Conclusion
A summary of our contributions is given in Table 3, to be compared with the state
of the art in Table 2.
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Õ
(m
n
)
Õ
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We have provided certificates that can save overall computational time for the Provers
and an order of magnitude in terms of communication volume or number of rounds.
Table 1 compares linear and quadratic communications, as well as sub-cubic (PLUQ,
CharPoly) or quadratic matrix operations. These results show first that it is interesting
to use linear space certificates even when they have quadratic Verification time. The
table also presents a practical constant factor of about 5 between PLUQ and CharPoly
computations.
One key idea in our contribution is to certify the existence of a triangular matrix in
an equivalence relation, by having an n round protocol where data dependency matches
the triangular shape of the unknown matrix factor. This approach was successfully
adapted to the certificate of generic rank profileness, where now two triangular unknown
triangular factors are considered, in the LU decomposition.
Mulmuley’s Laurent’s polynomial representation of a matrix successfully replaces the
former technique to certify triangular equivalence, and consequently row or column rank
profiles, reducing the number of rounds from linear to constant. However, we were unable
to adapt this technique for the certificate for generic rank profileness, and consequently
for certifying a rank profile matrix.
The use of symmetric Gaussian elimination allowed us to achieve a more practical
certificate for the signature of symmetric integer matrices. Even though it is based on
LDLT certificates with linear communication modulo a prime, the diagonal of rational
eigenvalues remains quadratic in size, and full precision was required to recover their
sign. Designing a linear communication, Prover efficient protocol to certify the signature
is the other major open problem which should be investigated in the continuation of this
work.
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